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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
JERRY SINE and DO·RA A. SINE, 
Respondents, 
vs 
MILDRED IONA HARPER, Admin-
CASE NO·. 
7386 
BRIEF OF 
istratrix of the estate of Cathrine RESPO·NDENTS 
Jensen, deceased, 
Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
:Since the statement of facts in the brief of app·ellant 
does not comply with Rule VIII, sub-paragraph 1, of 
the rules of the Sup-reme Court, respondents request 
that the said statement of facts be ignored by this Hon-
orable Court. Rather than attempt to correct that 
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2 
statement and supply transcript references to support 
the changes, we restate the facts of the case, supported 
by references to the transcript, as required by the rules. 
The respondents purchased a large tract of land 
in Block 61, Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, a por-
tion of Salt Lake County, in February 1946 (R. 48, 53, 
Exhibit B). One additional parcel "ras purchased in 
the Sl>'ring of 1947 which completed respondents' owner-
ship of all the south property in Block 3 except for the 
tract involved in this litigation and one other (R. 55). 
Exhibit B is -a plat of this property, which in outline is 
reproduced here. All of the open area was purchased in 
1946, the shaded area was purchased in 1947, and the 
property in dispute is shown in black. 
The respondents engaged a real estate agent, ·Mr. 
·Dowell, ''to purchase the property west of my property, 
the corner prop·erty, so that I could square my property 
that was in the rear" (R. 64). Mr. Dowell testified that 
he _was engaged to purchase ''the property including 
the duplex adjoining his auto court" (R. 108). Mr. 
Dowell determined that Cathrine Jensen owned the 
property and contacted her at her residence on 8th South 
in, Salt Lake City, telling her he was a real estate agent, 
and: ''I understand you own some property on West 
North Temple adjoining the Bishop-,s Auto Court." She 
replied that she did an~ there was a discussion of p~rice 
and _Mrs. Jensen aaked who wanted to buy it. Mr. 
Dowell rep1ied, ''The man who owns the ·auto court 
next to it, Mr. Sine," and Mrs. Jensen replied that, ''He 
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4 
should pay more for it." (R. 117). At a later conver-
sation between Mr. Dowell and Mrs. J ens,en there was a 
further discussion· concerning the price and l\1r. Dowell 
said, ''The fact remains, you are getting more than 
$100 a foot for it. This buyer is going to tear the house 
down anyway,'' and advised her that a tract do\vn the 
street had been sold for $85 a foot (R. 121). 
Mr. Dowell later testified that on the occasion of 
his first visit he advised Mrs. Jensen that the property 
was more valuable to his client than to anyone else and 
''that is the main reason he is p,aying $8,000. The main 
reason is to straighten this out. However, he has in mind 
building a cafe there'' (R. 194). And Mrs. Jensen re-
plied, ''Well, I have had in mind doing something of 
that nature myself, if my health permitted or if I had 
somebody to entrust it to whom I could rely upon. I 
still might do that. * * * * The children don't want me 
to sell it but I am glad to be free of it for the reason 
that I just can't take care of it" (R. 195). 
Exhibit C vvas ·executed by the respondents and 
then by l\frs. Jensen (R. 62, 110), and subsequently Ex-
hibit D was executed, first by the respondents (R. 71, 
122). Both testified that they did not read the document 
( R. 82, 90, and 97). Mr. Sine testified that he relied 
upon his realtor and his attorney to protect him. (R. 72, 
73, 82, 90, and 92), and both testified that they thought 
they were buying the p~roperty adjoining theirs and 
would not have signed Exhibit D had they known that 
a 25¥2 foot strip was being omitted (R. 79, 82, and 98). 
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Mr. Sine testified that the entire 75 feet had been 
used together, the vacant 2~ feet for the parking of 
cars, dumping of refuse, and stringing of clotheslines 
for the benefit of the ocrupants of the duplex (R. 58, 
61, and 62). ~Irs. Sine and nlr. Do1vell testified to sub-
stantia1ly the same thing (R. 99 and 196). Nothing 
separates the t'vo tracts (R. 50, 76, 169, and 176). The 
sewer plug for servicing the house is on the 25.% foot 
strip (R. -!9, 61-62) and a little way into the vacant 
piece (R. 49, 87). ~Ir. Sine testified that after the con-
tract here involved was entered into he took p·ossession 
of the entire tract, removed the rubbish, removed the 
shed from the property, and continued to use l.t to p-ark 
cars both for occupants of the dup1ex and for other guests 
of the motor court (R. 74, 75, 77, and 83). Mr. Sine 
learned that Exhibit D covered only 49% feet on July 24, 
1948 (R. 80). It appeared in testimony that l\1:rs. Jensen 
paid taxes on the 25%-foot .strip on November 24, 1947, 
and it must therefore be assumed that sh·e was aware 
of the description in Exhibit D on that date (R. 186). 
~fr. Dowell testified that he obtained an abstract 
from Mrs. Jensen (R. 123) and from it a .stenographer 
in his office prepared Exhibit D (R. 133). This abstract 
was apparently Exhibit 1, and Mr. Dowell testified that 
he assumed he referred his secretary to page 61 of the 
abstract since that page is a deed to Cathrine Brady 
(R. 139-140). He testified that he knew the tract he was 
attempting to buy was more than 491f2 feet and that if 
he had noticed the description of 49% feet he would have 
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known it was erroneous (R. 141). The plat of property 
in the front of Exhibit 1 shows the entire 75 feet for 
whieh res'pondents were negotiating a.s a unit and the 
later entries . in- that abstract show a division of the 
p-roperty into 49¥2 feet and 25 0 feet. ~1r. Dowell testi-
fied that the property was over-priced at e;8,500 on the 
assumption that the entire 75 feet 'vas being purchased 
(R. 141). 
The appellant offered testimony from the daughters 
of the deceased Cathrine Jensen, the husband, and the 
former husband of the deceased as to her state of mind 
and her intentions, based upon purported conversations 
with them, all of which were in September 1947 or later, 
except the conversation with Mrs. Wheeler, purporting 
to have taken place on the date the ~earnest money re-
ceipt, Exhibit C, was signed (R. 210-211) and one with 
Mrs. Freeman soon after the sale. (R. 171). Mrs. 
Wheeler's testimony was that after the conversation 
between Mr. Dowell and her mother, her mother told 
her that the people who owned the tourist court wanted 
to buy her property and the mother suggested they go 
up to look at it, and after they arrived at the property 
this statement was made, according to Mrs. Wheeler: 
''A. Well mother, she said, 'They are not 
buying all of this. ' She said, ' They are buying 
this that the house is on', and showed me what it 
was and I asked her why ·she wasn't selling the 
other twenty-five feet and she said, 'I didn't buy 
that with the place and I am not selling it with 
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the place.' She said she wanted to put a ham-
burger stand some place on it and she said, 'I 
am not selling the place.' " (R. 210-211) 
Mrs. "rheeler did not know 'vhat papers had been signed 
at that time but her mother said she "had sold it'' and 
that was all (R. 211). 
The appellant, another daughter of Cathrine J en-
sen, testified that there had never been any buildings on 
the 25% foot strip or any clotheslines (R. 158). She 
testified to a conversation with her mother in October 
1948 in 'Yhich her mother wanted her father (Mrs. Jen-
sen's first husband, C. W. Biddinger,) to build a three-
or four-room house on the property (R. 15~). And in 
the fall of 1947 ~Irs. Jensen indicated that she wanted 
~fr. Biddinger to build a hamburger place or lunch 
stand on the property (R. 156). 
Another daughter, Mrs. Freeman, also testified that 
there "\Yere no clotheslines or sheds or outbuildings on 
the 25_0 foot piece of property (R. 169), and testified 
that she discussed that piece of property' after the trans-
action with Mr. Sine right after the property had been 
sold, and: 
''A. 1\Iother said I could go ahead and use 
the twenty-fiv.e and one half foot piece and n1y 
father could build us a little hamburger place and 
little. lunchstand and she thought he "\Vas a good 
cook and he could cook and I could help him. She 
said that would be adequate, it would be plenty 
large for a little five cent place and since there 
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was tourist cabins around there and she thought 
that would be a nice place and I mentioned that 
to Mrs. Sine * * * " (R. 172). -
Mrs. FTeeman also testified that in June 1948 her mother 
told her that if her father did not want to build a lunch-
stand he could build a little home on the North Temple 
property (R. 173-174). 
Mr. Biddinger, the first husband, testified to a con-
versation in September 1947 in which Mrs. Jensen indi-
cated ·she wanted ?im to build a hamburger stand on 
the p·rop!erty (R. 179) and that in June 1948 she indicated 
a desire to have him build a little house on the same 
pie·ce (R. 180). 
James C. Jensen, the husband of Cathrine Jensen, 
at the time of the sale here involved, testified that after 
the transaction with Mr. Sine Mrs. Jensen talked of 
letting ·Mrs. Freeman and her father build a hamburger 
stand on the property (R. 185); also, that on November 
24, 194 7, Mrs. Jensen paid the taxes on the 25,0 foot 
strip (R. 185). Before the sale involved here, Mrs. 
Jensen had talked of building some cabins on the 250 
foot strip (R. 184). 
CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
1. It was error for the Court to admit testimony 
of conversations with the deceased Cathrine Jensen oc-
curring long after the sale to the respondents. 
2. It was error for the Court to admit testimony 
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9 
of conversations with the deceased shortly after the time 
of sale to the respondents. 
3. It was error for the Court to refuse to strike 
the testimony of l\Irs. Harp_er of conversations with the 
deceased after the sale (R. 152-153.). 
ARGUMENT 
We will argue, first, -our three cros·s-assignments 
of error and will then argue the five points discussed by 
the appellant in her brief. 
I. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO· ADMIT 
TESTIMONY OF CONVERSATIONS WITH THE 
DECEASED CATHERINE JENSEN O·CCUR.RING 
LONG AFTER THE SALE TO THE RESPONDENTS. 
Logically, our cross-assignments of error should 
be argued after the assignm·ents of the appellant. They 
are argued first in this brief so that the Court will 
understand the nature of the testimony upon which ap-
pellant relied in defense, so that under point V of the 
appellant's argument (point VIII of this brief) the 
Court can exclude from consideration evidence which 
was properly inadmissible and it can therefore he ig-
nored in resolving ap·p·ellant's point V. 
Appellant's testimony of conversations with the de-
ceased occurred in September 1947 or later, except that 
l\f rs. Freeman testified to a conversation ''right .after'' 
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the prop·erty had been sold (R. 171) and Mrs. Wheeler 
testified to a conversation ap1)larently on the date the 
earnest money receipt was executed (R. 210). With 
these two exceptions, testimony as to conversations with 
the deceased was remote from the transaction involved 
in this litigation· and not shown to have been safeguard-
ed by admissions against interests or spontaneous ex-
clamation, or otherwise. All of the statements are plain-
ly self-serving and Mrs. Wheeler's could not have been 
more to the point from the standpoint of the appellant 
if the deceas·e·d had dictated it after the filing of the 
lawsuit and as a means of . establishing her defense. 
At the time the first witneas offered to testify con-
cerning a conversation with -the deceased, the Court ex-
pre~sed doubt as to its admissibility (R. 150) but Coun-
sel for the appellant argued that the testimony was 
similar to some already offered by the respondents (and 
now strenously objected to under point IV of app~ellant's 
argument), as though that were a reason for admissibil-
ity (R. 150). 
It is fundamental that self-serving declarations are 
not admissible. Salt Lake Brewing Co. v. Hawke and 
Andrews, 24 Utah 199, 208, 6·6 P. 1058; Clayton v. Ogden 
State Bank, 82 Utah 564, 567, 26 P. 2d 545; Jones Com-
mentaries on the Law of Evidence, page 1636; 31 C. J. 
s .. 948. 
Salt Lake Brewing Co. v. Hawke and Andrews 
(supra) was an action against two partners for money 
loaned by the plaintiff. One partner obtained the money 
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and absconded and the question was whether the ab-
sconding partner had authority to receive the money · 
for the partnership. Testimony was received tha.t the 
innocent partner, after learning of the loss, had stated 
that it 'vas not his responsibility. The Court said: 
'' "r e are of the opinion that the admission 
of this testin1ony was p·rejudicial error. It wa.s 
already hearsay, and the statement of the defend-
ant Andre"~s at that tim·e, after he found that 
there """ould be an attempt made to hold him liable 
for the money borrowed by his partner, was 
simply a self-serving declaration, and was not 
admissible for any purpose.'' 
Clayton v. Ogden State Bank (supra) wa.s an action 
against an administrator for the value of services rend-
ered. This Court held that plaintiff's testimony of a 
letter sent by him to the deceased was prop·erly excluded: 
'' * * * * Exhibit A, the letter from plaintiff 
to deceased, is purely a .self-serving document and -
aside from the effect of the statute or other con-
necting evidence was properly rejected by the 
trial court. ' ' 
The fact that Cathrine J en.sen was deceased does 
not make her extra-judicial utterances admissible: 
''The mere fact of death, alone, does not 
render competent self-serving conduct, admis- ~ 
sions or declarations of the deceased person dur-
ing his lifetime.'' Jones Commentaries on the 
I.~a\v of Evidence, page 1642. 
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''The death of the declarant does not render 
his self-serving declarations admissible, except 
in jurisdictions where the rule has been changed 
by statute. " 31 C. J. S. 953. 
The annotation to this statement includes cases from 27 
jurisdictions, but none from Utah. Without presuming 
to know upon what theory the appellant offered this 
testimony, we suggest that the most plausible theory wa.3 
under the ''Res gestae'' exception to the hearsay rule. 
With the exception of the two conversations indicated, 
this theory is too far-fetched to deserve comment, and 
we therefore consider this possibility under our point II. 
II. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ADMIT 
TESTIMO·NY O·F CONVERSATIONS WITH THE 
DECEASED SHORTL·Y AFTER THE TIME OF 
SALE TO THE RE:SiPONDENTS. 
The testimnoy of Mra. Freeman was that her con-
versation with her mother took place right after the 
property had been sold but that it took place at her 
own home, and there is no indication that this conver-
sation was the same day, or even the sam·e week (R. 171). 
·Less remote was the conversation to which Mrs. Wheeler 
testified. This one took place sometime after the con-
versation between Mr. Dowell and Mra. Jensen and after 
Mrs. Wheeler and her mother, according to the testi-
mony had ·driven to the prop,erty on _North Temple 
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13 
Street from 8th South (R. 209-211). Were the circum-
stances such as to permit the Court to receive this testi-
mony under this exception to the hearsay rule? 
Little "'"ould be accomplished by an attempt to ex-
amine into the reasons for the Res gestae exception to 
the hearsay rule. This aspect of the p-roblem has been 
before the court, as evidenced by Mr. Justice Wolfe's 
special concurrence in State v. Rasmussen, 92 Utah 357 
at pages 372 to 37 ±. The difficulties of the doctrine are 
discussed by both Jones and Wigmore in their works on 
evidence. W ~ assume that the exception i.s well-estab-
lished and that the reasons for its existence are suf-
ficient, and simply inquire into the decided cases in ask-
ing this Court to rule on the testimony received in this 
case. 
Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 Utah 21, 37 
to 40, 290 P. 970, wa.s an action for personal injuries in 
which plaintiff obtained a judgment. Plaintiff offered 
testimony of statements of defendant's motorman to the 
plaintiff, her husband, a policeman, and in reporting the 
accident over the telephone. On appeal this Court said, 
at page 37: 
"It is urged that the statements or declara-
tions made by the motorman to the husband, to 
the plaintiff, and to the policeman, were improp-
erly received in evidence. Such testimony was re-
ceived under the R.es gestae rule.'' 
In sustaining the lower court in receiving this testimony, 
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14 
this Court laid down the tests which should be observed, 
as follows: 
''In view of ·such considerations we think the 
statements or declarations made by the motorman 
to the husband, to the plaintiff, and to the police-
man were J>~roperly received in evidence. They 
were made so nearly coincident with the collision 
-within three or four minutes thereafter-and 
so closely connected with and related to it and 
tended to ·explain or elucidate it, and made under 
such circumstances as to pr·eclude premeditation 
or design in the making of them, and sufficiently 
shown to have been the result of the immediate 
and p·resent influences of the transaction or pre-
ceding circumstances to which they related as to 
render them admissible in evidence. The state-
ments were in no sense self serving. While declar-
ations made for or against one party or the other 
to a cause is not itself a determining factor of 
their admissibility and to be admissible it is not 
essential that the declarations be disserving if 
they otherwise have the requisites rendering them 
admissible under the rule, still, declarations which 
are disserving, as here they were, are more likely 
to be instinctive and spontaneous and not the re-
sult of premeditation or design, than declarations 
which, if made under other circumstances, may 
be self-serving. As stated in the Cromeenes Case, 
the basis of the rule is not admissions against in-
terest, but trustworthiness of the statements, 
p·rovable, not as the testimony of the declarant, 
but as a part of the transaction itself, like any 
other material fact or evidentiary detail.'' 
A.s to the telephone conversation, this Court held 
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that it should have been excluded upon this r,easoning: 
''The admission in evidence a.s to what the 
motqrman stated w·hile talking over the telephone 
stands on a somewhat different footing. As to 
the question of time there was no substantial dif-
ference as to that statement and the other state-
ments, but the character of the statement and the 
circumstances under which it was made were ma-
terially different. The statement over the tele-
phone was more in the nature of making a report, 
the witness who testified concerning the making 
of it not kno,Ying "~hether the statement was made 
to some one in the defendant's office or to some 
one at the police station; but in either case, the 
motorman was merely reporting or giving notice 
of an accident. Such a report or statement in 
the very nature of things is not in.stinctive or 
spontaneous though made within four minutes or 
thereabouts after the accident. What prompted 
or induced. the statements made to the husband 
and the plaintiff was wholly different from that 
which prompted or induced the statement over the 
telephone. We thus think the statement made by 
the motorman over the .telephone "\vas improp·erly 
1 received. ' ' 
The principles of this case 'vere followed in Balle v. 
Smith, 81 Utah 179 at 198, 17 P. 2d 224, where, after 
quoting from Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., the 
court said: 
''The declaration offered meets the require-
ments or this rule, and should have been admitted. 
It was made 'vithin a very fe'v 1ninute.s after the 
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collision and before any of the parties concerned 
had left the scene of the accident, so as to be con-
temporaneous within the rule announced. in the 
Jackson C·ase. It was closely connected With and 
related to the accident, and tended to explain and 
elucidate it. It was made under circumstances 
which indicate its spontaneous character and to 
preclude premeditation or design or opportunity 
for reflection, and is sufficiently shown to have 
been the result of the immediate and present influ-
ences of the colli.sion. The nature of the occasion 
was such as to cause shock and excitement, and to 
render utterances within a few minutes by those 
concerned in the accident as spontaneous and un-
reflecting. The declaration, though subsequent by 
a few minutes, was yet near enough in time to 
allow the assumption that the exciting influence 
-continued.'' 
And, again, in State v. Rasmussen, supra, 92 Utah 
357, 68 P. 2d 176, the circumstance out of which the 
declaration arose was an automobile accident. This was 
a prosecution of a hit and run driver and holds that 
the trial court has some discretion in the admission of 
declarations as part of Res gestae. In that case, one 
l\:faloney testified as to the death of his companions and 
his PFesence at the scene of the accident. The defendant 
offered testimony of one Zackerson-that he arrived 
at the scene of the accident apparently before anyone 
else and while Maloney was still excited and was still 
near the body of one of his companions and asked 
l\faloney how it ha'ppened. The trial court refused to 
let him ans,ver. The Supreme Court said, at page 361: 
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"Had it been shown that the utterances of-
fered to be proved were spontaneous, made under 
stress or the excitement of the oocurrence, the 
proffered proof might have presented a different 
question. Nothing appears as to how soon after 
the alleged accident occurred the statements were 
made. The declaration offered may have been 
made within a very few minutes after the accident 
or so closely contemporaneous with it as to come. 
within the rule laid down by this court in the case 
of Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 f. (2d) 224, at 
page 232 of the Pacific Reporter. It must be 
recognized that the trial court has some disere-
tion in the admission of declarations of this char-
acter when the declarations are not immediate, 
spontaneous, or made under stress of excitement. 
The court should be fully satisfied by the evi-
dence that a statement claimed to be res gestae 
comes within the rule and meets all the require-
ments. It is not clearly apparent in the instant 
case that the declaration made meets the require-
ments of the Balle v. Smith, supra." 
The concurrence of l\Ir. Justice Wolfe in this case cau-
tions that the tests to bring a declaration within this ex-
ception are S'pontaneity, absence of reflection, and the 
automatic nature of the declaration, and that the discre-
tion of the trial court lies in determining whether these 
tests are satisfied. 
A later, but similar, Utah ease is 1forton v. Hood, 
105 Utah, 484, 143 P. 2d 434. 
Wigmore states in Section 1749 of his Third Edition 
of Evidence that this exception to the hearsay rule, as 
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11 Others is ;supported by a circumstantial-probabil-are a ' · th · b 
·t f t ustworthiness. Spontaneousness gives e pro -
1 y 0 r l t• w· 
ability of trustworthiness to these dec ara Ions. Ig-
more says: 
''This circumstantial guarantee here consists 
in the consideration, already noted, that in the 
stress of nervous excitement the reflective facul-
ties Inay be stilled and the utterance may become 
the ul'\reflecting and 3incere expression of one's 
actual impressions and belief." 
And in the succeeding section ~fr. Wigmore con1menfs 
on the requirements that there be a startling occasion, 
a sta ten1ent 1nade before there has been time to fabricate 
and that it relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. 
1'he facts testified to by l\frs. Wheeler are that on 
the day of ~I r. Do"rell's second conversation with her 
1nother and after that conversation (whieh 1\lr. Do,vell 
said \\"as quite lengthy (R. 121), J\irs. Jensen suggested 
that they take a ride over to the North T·emple property 
( R. 20!)). ..After they arrived there :airs. Jensen 'vHhout 
an~T explanation of 'vhy any question was raised as to 
"·hat 'vas covered b~T the contract she had just executed, 
proceeded to give a self-serving statement of 'vhat 'vas 
in the document and \vhat \vas not intended to be covered 
h~· the document. There had been mueh more elapsed 
time than the usual three or four minutes found by thjs 
court to be sufficient, there was no showing that Mrs. 
~Jensen V\ras excited or that she lvas acting withont op-
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~ portunity to deliberate and to accomplish a purpose 'vith 
:l!l her declaration. 
· l Of course, the trial court did not believe the daug-h-
ters of the decea~rd and this assignment of error becomes 
important only in the event this Court should order a 
new trial, and in that event, it 'vould be a guide on the 
next trial. It 'viii be referred to again under Point VIII 
of this argun1ent. 
III. 
IT ,,T_A_S EI{ROR FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE 
TO STRIKE THE TESTI}fONY OF MRS. HARPER 
OF CON,TERSATIONS \VITH THE DECEASED 
_A_FTER THE SALE (R. 152-153). 
No special point is made of this assignment of 
error. The court was doubtful 'vhether this testimony 
w·as admissible and suggested that counsel for respond-
ents make a motion to strike if he deemed the evidence 
inadmissible. This motion was made at a prop·er time 
and was denied by the court (R. 152-153). This was 
error in the same manner as the original ruling over 
respondents' objections 'vas error. 
IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PER11ITTING HEAR-
SAY EVIDENCE OF THE STATEJ\IENTS OF 
PLAINTIFFS TO THEIR AGENT CONCERNING 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PURCHASE THE 250-FOOT 
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are all others, is .supported by a circumstantial probabil-
ity of trustworthiness. Spontaneousness gives the prob-
ability of trustworthiness to these declarations. Wig-
more says: 
"This circumstantial guarantee here consists 
in the consideration, already noted, that in the 
stress of nervous excitement the reflective facul-
ties may be stilled and the utterance n1ay beco1ne 
the unreflecting and 3incere expression of one's 
actual.impressions and belief.'' 
And in the succeeding section ~fr. Wigmore con1ments 
on the requirements that there be a startling occasion, 
a sta te1nent made he fore there has been time to fabricate 
and that it relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. 
The facts testified to by ~1rs. Wheeler are that on 
the day of !1:r. Dowell's second conversation with her 
mother- and after that conversation (which 1\fr. Do,vell 
said was quite lengthy (R. 121), l\1rs. Jensen suggested 
that they take a ride over to the North T'emple property 
(R. 209). After they arrived there n.rrs. Jensen '"'jthout 
any explanation of 'vhy any question was raised as to 
'vhat was covered by the contract she had just executed, 
proceeded to give a self-serving statement of what was 
in the document and what was not intended to he covererl 
by the document. There had been much more elapsed 
time than the usual three or four minutes found by this 
court to be sufficient, there was no showing that Mrs. 
Jensen was excited or that she 'vas acting withont op-
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portunity to deliberate and to acco1nplish a purpose \vith 
her declaration. 
Of course, the trial court did not believe the daugh-
ters of the deceased and this assignn1ent of error beco1nes 
in1portant only in the event thi.s Court should order a 
new tri·al, and in that event, it \Vould be a guide on the 
next trial. It \Vill be referred to again under Point VIII 
of this argun1en t. 
III. 
IT ''T AS El{ROR v-,OR THE COURT TO REFUSE 
TO STRIKE THE TESTI~fONY OF MRS. HARPER 
OF CON,rERSATIONS "\VITH THE DECEASED 
.L-\FTER THE SALE (R. 152-153). 
No special point is made of this assignment of 
error. The court was doubtful \Vhether this testimony 
was ad1nissible and suggested that counsel for respond-
ents make a motion to strike if he deemed the evidence 
inadmi.ssible. This motion was made at a proper time 
and was denied by the court (R. 152-153). This was 
error in the same manner as the original ruling over 
respondents' objections \vas error. 
IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PER~IITTING HEAR-
SAY E'TIDENCE OF THE STATEl\IENTS OF 
PLAINTIFFS TO THEIR AGENT CONCERNING 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PURCHASE- THE 250-FOOT 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
TRACT, AND IN FINDING THAT SUCH WERE 
TH·E INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT PLAINTIFFS IN-
TENDED TO. PURCHASE THE SAID 25~-FOOT 
TRACT. (Appellant's point I) 
Having in mind all that has gone before, respondents 
contend that the testimony of respondent Sine and of 
the agent Dowell, set forth at page 19 of appellant's 
brief, was properly admitted as a verbal act creating 
the agency between them. It was necessary for the 
respondent to show agency and that Dowell was author-
ized to convey to the deceased the state of mind and in-
tention of the respondent and also because there was a 
question as to whose agent Mr. Dowell was. The appell-
ant contend~d that Dowell was the agent of the deceased 
(R. 111, 114) and the respondents contended that Dowell 
was their agent (R. 111, 112), and the court made find-
ing of fact number 5 on this is8ue (R. 37). Under these 
circumstances, the testimony was properly received. 
On this question, in Wisconsin Orange Crush Bottl-
ing Co. v. Meicher, 198 Wis. 461, 224 N. W. 702, the 
que8tion of agency was in dispute and testimony had 
been received as to the terms of that agency. At page 
704 of 224 N. W., the Wisconsin Supreme Court said: 
''It is strenuously o hjected that the testi-
mony given by Charles 1\feicher as to his con-
versation with Bumpus and detailing the extent 
of the agency \vas not competent upon the general 
ground that they were self -serving declarations. 
\Ve are cited to no ca,~es sustaining surh a prop-
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osition. What Meicher testified to was the ar-
rangement between him and Bumpus. That a 
principal may not testify to the terms of the con-
tract made by him with an agent is certainly a 
novel contention. How else would the contract 
of agency be established~ The burden was upon 
Paull to establish the fact of agency, which he 
endeavored to do by inference.'' 
See, also, Rice and Bullen Maulting Co. v. International 
Bank, 185 Ill. 427, 56 N. E. 1062; Stevick v~ V en-
num, 227 Ill. App. 86; Wigmore, Vol. 6, page 200, quot-
ing Roebke v. Andrews, 26 Wis. 311, 321. 
A similar Utah case is Webb and Webb v. Webb, et 
al, (decided August 1949), 209 P. 2d 201, in which an 
attorney at law was called to testify c~ncerning the mean-
ing and purpose of written docun1ents, including a deed 
and a check. The testimony was admitted by the trial 
court and in upholding the ruling this Court aaid: 
''The conversationa objected to as he resay 
"\Vere not used to prove facts therein asserted to 
exist hut the fact \vhether such conversations oc-
c:lrred \Vere material issues in the case. The 
conversations bet,veen the attorney and the dece-
dent sho\v the attorney's authority and the pur-
poses and lin1itation.s of such authority. The con-
versations bet\veen the attorney and respondents 
sho\ved negotiations for and the consummation 
of a rleal \vith respondents in accordance with the 
attorney's authority. There was no assertion by 
an extra-judicial witness of a material fact for 
the purpose of proving the existence of .such 
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fact but the fact tha.t such conversations occurred 
' were circumstances which showed the purpose 
and intention of decedent to convey to the re-
spondents unconditionally. The attorney was the 
one who acted for the decedent in the transactions 
involved herein and his evidence was. competent 
to relate his version thereof and a relation of the 
conversationo he had with the principals in the 
transaction was not hearsay, even though it neces-
sarily included statements made by the other 
parties to the conversation which were not made 
in the presence of appellant. '' 
Although the testimony wao offered upon the theory 
of creating agency (R. 64-66), it was probably admis-
sible to show the state of mind of respondent Jerry Sine, 
which was a material issue in the case. Such testimony 
was received and approved by this Court in Butterfield 
v. Consolidated Fuel Co., 42 Utah 499, 132 P. 559; 1viower 
v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 268-269, 228 P. 911. Appellant 
might argue that this latter case supports the declara-
tions of the deceased as testified to by her daughters. 
The case is distinguishable on two important grounds: 
(a) The declarations in this case are self -serving and 
were not such in the nfoV\'er case; and (b) the declara-
tions in the J\!ovver case, although given after alleged 
con1pletion of the alleged transaction, were admissible 
because, the existence of the transaction, i.e., delivery 
of the deed, was an issue in the case. In the case at bar 
there is no issue as to \vhether a con tract "\Vas 1nade, and 
evidence subseq~ent to the n1aking of it becomes self-
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serving. Testimony offered by respondents concerns 
state of mind before contracting, as well as being part 
of a verbal act; testimony of the appellant concerns 
state of mind after contracting. 
v. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING ANY 
TESTIMONY THE EFFECT OF WHICH WAS TO 
VARY THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN UNIF·ORM 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. (Appellant's point II) 
Respondents humbly suggest that ap·pellant has mis-
conceived the meaning of Section 104-48-15, U. C. A. 1943, · 
which is the parol evidence rule. It is not applicable to 
this case because the documents themselves were put in 
evidence, thereby satisfying the parol evidence rule. And 
that parol evidence cannot be received to vary the terms 
of a written instrument is not applicable to suits in 
equity for reformation of written contracts. Walden v. 
Skinner, 101 U. S. 597, 25 L. Ed. 963; 45 Am. Jur. 650. 
VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DE-
CREEING THAT THERE W A·S. A CONTRACT FOR 
THE SALE AND PURCHASE OF THE 25lj2 FOO·T 
TRACT O·F LAND NOT DESCRIBED IN THE WRIT-
TEN UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT AS 
SUCH CONTRACT IS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. (Appellant's point III) 
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It cannot be argued succ~ssfully that the written 
docum·ents in this case do"-not satisfy the statute of 
frauds. Appellant does not S? contend under her Point 
III. Her argument apparently is that respondents seek 
to eatablish an agreement different !:rom one reduced 
to writing. This, of course, is the essence of suit for 
reformation of a contract and the statute of frauds has 
been held to be no obstacle. 86 A.L.R. 448, at page 450, 
thus states the general rule: 
''It is well settled by the weight of authority 
that the. Statute of Frauds does not prevent the 
reformation of a deed so aa to enlarge the prop-
erty or interest conveyed.'' 
VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
WITNES:S, DOWELL, TO TESTIFY TO CONVER-
SATIONS AND NEGO·TIATIONS WITH CATHER-
INE JENSEN IN VIOLATION OF SEC·TION 104-49-
2(3), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943. (Appellant's 
point IV.) 
Appellant's brief at page 27 notes a split of author-
ity on the question as to whether or not the statute ap-
plies to the testimony of an agent for the party who 
sues the deceased's representative. We agree with ap-
pellant's statement on that page, that thia Court has 
never ruled on this precise question. 
At page 35 of her brief, appellant refers to the 
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statement at 70 Corpus Juris 2·66, and states that ''pos-
sibly the weight of authority" permits an ag·ent of the 
surviving party to testify as to transaction-s with the 
decedent. 
The cases cited by the appellant in this section of 
her brief do not involve any statute like the Utah statute, 
and Jones in his Comn~entaries on Evidence, at pages 
4247 to 4248, says that there are so many different dead 
n1an 's statutes and such conflicting rulings between the 
states that precedents in one state are of very little 
value in other states. 
The question under our statute is whether an agent 
of the surviving 'P'arty is a ''person directly interested'' 
in a suit against the estate of a deceased person. This 
suit was not started against a representative of the de-
ceased person but against the vendor hers-elf, and it is 
no fault of the respondents that Cathrine Jensen died 
without having her de position taken, any more than 
it is the fault of the appellant. The statute seems to 
suggest no distinction between an action brought against 
a representative of a deceased person and a suit where 
such representative is substituted after the action is 
commenced; but th~ argument about sealing the mouths 
of witnesses when the mouth of the deceased is s·ealed 
by death does not apply so strongly where the parties 
in good faith have commenced a suit against a vendor 
who would apparently be free to testify to the transac-
tions at the trial. 
The question involved in this case was annotated 
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at 21 A. L. R. 928, and :Subdivision III, annotates this 
question ''under p~rovision disqualifying party in int~r­
est. '' Our statute states a ''person'' instead of ''party'' 
~ut requires ''direct'' interest (and the annotation sub-
heading does not. The annotation states the rule that 
''in construing this provision it is generally held that 
an agent of the surviving party is not a party in interest, 
within the meaning of the statute, and .so is not incom-
petent to testify as to transactions had with the de-
ceased." No Utah cases are listed and neither are there 
any cases from California, Idaho or Montana, whose 
statutes are like ours, according to the reference 'follow-
ing Section 104-49-2, U. C. A., 1943. The supplemental 
annotation at 54 A. L. R. 264 confirms the general rule, 
but likewise contain.s no cases from any of the four 
states, and neither do the supplemental annotations. 
'V e have likewise examined the references in the Amer-
ican Digest System under Key No. 140 (16) under the 
title, Witnesses, and have found no decision from any 
of these four states. 
Appellant relies on a Mis.3ouri case which deals with 
a party to the contract and the annotation at 21 A. L. R., 
page 927, establishes this as a separate digest heading 
and as not contrary to the general rule referred to 
under Subdivision III. Numerous, Missouri and some 
other cases are cited i~ the annotation, which res'pond-
ent.s submit are not in point And, in any event, appell-
ant's tvvo cases, relied on at pages 28 and 29, have been 
overruled, Banking House of Wilcoxon v. Road by Wag-
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ner v. Binder, 187 S. W. 1128 (see 21 A. L. R. at 938) 
and Taylor v. George by Allen Estate v. Boeke, 254 S. 
W. 858 and Curtis v. Alexander, 257 s .. W. 432 (see 54 
A. L. R. 265-266). 
Appellant argues that the agent Dowell -had s-ome 
n1otive to falsify and therefore should have been dis-
qualified as a person interested in the event of the-
suit. The testilnony from R. 153 is shown at pages 31 
and R2 of appellant's brief. Dowell testified that he 
'vas not concerned about coll~ting his commission as he 
had a note for that but that he was interested in seeing 
Mr. Sine prevail because he feels that he fell down on 
the job. ·Appellant tries to convert this into an interest 
in the outcome of the action by arguing that perhaps 
the respondents would have a suit against the witness 
Dowell if they lost this suit. ·That ia, of course, highly 
conjectural and no judgment in this action would be 
binding on the respondents or Dowell in an action against 
him, and what evidence there might be to sup·port such 
an action is purely sp~eculative and was not gone into in 
this trial. And on thia question two cases from other · 
jurisdictions seem helpful. 
In Johnson v. Matthews, 301 Ill. App. 295, 22 N. E. 
2d 772, a real estate broker. testified against the estate 
of a creditor in a transaction that he was p.ersonally 
interested in the success of the debtor for whom he testi-
fied. The trial court refused to admit the testimony and 
found for the creditor against whom the broker was 
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willing to testify. The appellate court, in reversing this 
judgment, said: 
''The interest which disqualifies a witness 
from testifying against an administrator must 
be an actual financial interest that will result in 
pecuniary gain or loss for th~ witness. It has 
nothing whatever to do with his understanding 
or feeling. This has been held in many cases in 
this and other states.'' 
The Illinois Statute, Ill. Ann. Stat. C. 51 Sec. 2, 
concerns a ''person directly interested in the event 
thereof'' in the ·exact language of our statute. 
And in re Hilbert's estate, 14 Wash. 475, 128 P. 2d 
647, it was held that an attorney could testify against the 
estate of a decedent and in behalf of his client, although 
he testified that the amount of his fee had not been fixed 
and that it depended in part on the outcome of the suit 
and that if his client was successful his fee would be 
larger. The court held that the attorney's testimony 
was properly received, relying on an earlier Washing-
ton case, Swindler v. Daniels, 123 Wash. 409, 212 P. 2d 
29. The statute being interpreted was Remington's 
Revised Statutes, Section 1211, which provides that a 
''party in interest'' is incon1petent to testify. 
The Utah case of Burnham et al. v. Eschler (June 
29, 1940), 208 P. 2d 06, seeins to support the testilnony 
of the real estate agent in this case inasn1uch as the 
Inotjv-e to falsif~, an(l the interest of the \Yitness appear 
to have heen stronger- in that case than in the raRe at 
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bar. The question in the Burnham ca.se was whether a 
deed executed by the deceased in her lifetime had been 
duly deliYered to her daughter with the intention that the 
daughter hold title to the property. The husband of the 
donee \Vas pern1itted to testify to c.onversations with the 
deceased, \vhich \\Tas assigned as error in this court under 
the clain1 that the husband was a party directly inter-
ested in the event of the action. On this question the 
conrt, at page 101 of the Pac. Rep. Advance ·Sheets, 
Y'" ol. :?C8, said: 
"If Mr. Eschler h-ad a direct interest, it was 
an intere~t in the transaction testified to, and 
not in the event of this action. In the annota-
tion at L. R. A. 1917 A 32, case.s are cited holding 
that the interest in the action must be pecuniary, 
direct, immediate, and not uncertain, contingent 
or remote, and that a husband is not incompetent 
because he may become a beneficiary under his. 
wife's will or succeed to her property by her in-
testacy. We held in Olson v. Scott, 61 Utah 42, 
210 P. 287, that the plaintiff's husband was en-
tirely competent to testify as to statements made 
by the plain tiff's deceased mother to the effect 
that certain bank deposits belonged to the plain-
tiff. Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 240, 228 P. 911, and 
the general rule on this point as stated in 58 Am. 
Jur. 195,-- Sec. 319, are in accord with this result. 
See also Clawson v. Wallace, 16 Utah 300, 52 
P. 9." 
To the same effect is Maxfield v. Sainabury, 110 Utah 
280, 172 p. 2d 122. 
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And so in the case at bar th,e testimony of the wit-
ness Dowell, tha.t he wanted the respondents to succeed 
beeause he had fallen down on his job of rep-resenting 
them, should he taken into account by the court in view 
of all of the other facts, including the fact that his com-
mission was fixed by a note and that he ·stood to make 
no gain financially by the outcome of the suit. Upon the 
reasoning of the court in Burnham v. Eschler, above 
noted, and stated by Mr. Justice Wade in his concurring 
opinion, this court should uphold the trial court in per-
mitting the witness Dowell to testify. 
VIII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF 
REFORMATIO·N, BECAUSE THERE IS NO CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE bF A MUTUAL 
11ISTAKE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE UNI-
FORl\f REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. (Appellant's 
point V.) 
Appellant asks this court to reverse the trial court 
on the ground that the evidence wa.s not sufficient to 
support the judgment. Appellant states the rule to 
require evidence which is clear, satisfactory, and con-
vincing. This is the rule stated in Forrester v. Cook, 
77 Utah 137 at 145, 292 P. 206, which case is discussed 
by appellant at page 52 of her brief. After using the 
above 'vords and noting t)1at a hare preponderance of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
the evidence is not sufficient, the court add.s, "unless 
a fair preponderanee of the evidence clearly and satis-
factorily eonvinc.es the court of the error.'' Respond-
ents believe thnt the evidence was clear, satisfactory, 
and eonvincing anJ also that there was a fair p-reponder-
ance of the eYidence 'Yhich clearly and satisfactorily 
con\inced the trial court that reformation should be 
granted and that this court 'Yilllike,vise be so convinced. 
It may be that the test in this court 'Nill he 'vhether the 
trial co1~rt, acting reasonably, could have found the evi-
dence clear and convincing and could have been clearly 
and satisfactorily convinced. 
Appellant recites some of the testimony of Mr. 
Dowell at pages 40 to 47 of her brief. This testimony 
shows that Dowell advised th·e deceased that the owner 
of the auto co-urt next to the property w·anted to buy it, 
after advising her that he was interested in purchasing 
the property ''adjoining the Bishop' .s Auto Court.'' 
Dowell also advised the deceased that the main reason 
respondents wanted the property was to straighten out 
their property and that they had in mind building a cafe 
there. Mrs. Jensen, the deceased, said she had thought 
of doing something like that if she had anyone to en-
trust it to and that, although her children did not want 
her to sell it, she wa.s ''glad to he free of it'' becaus·e 
she couldn't take care of it. And the price p·er foot was 
discussed, relating it to the 75-foot frontage. This 
testimony shows clearly the understanding of the parties 
that the transaction was to cover the property adjoining 
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the Bishop's Auto Court so as to straighten up the 
lines and that the deceased was parting with her pro-
perty there. 
The surrounding circumstances are also important, 
as observed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kadow 
v. Aluminum Specialty Co., 253 Wis. 76, 33 N. W. 2d 
236. That transaction involved some industrial property 
with a number of buildings on it, including a barracks, 
heating plant, and warehouse. After the transaction was 
consummated, it appeared that the boundary line as 
described in the deed cut off some of the buildings. 'The 
court observed that the parties assumed that the east 
line of the property would be such as to include the 
buildings and then made this statement: 
''At the time the transfer was consummated 
he had in his possession an insurance plat of the 
buildings showing the buildings to he entirely on 
the lots which the Kadows retained. The natural 
and reasonable inferences which the court had a 
right to draw from the circumstances and the na-
ture of the transaction added to the testimony of 
Kadow are sufficient to clearly and convincingly 
prove the alleged mistake.'' 
The important additional circumstance3 in thts case 
are that the respondents purchased their property in 
1946, as sho1vn by the sketch at page 3 of this brief, and 
subsequently added one piece of property adjoining the 
pro11erty involved in thi.s transaction. Since Mrs. Jensen 
had o\vned this property for man:v~ years, she n1ust haYr 
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been a\Yare of the acquisitions of the respondents and 
she indicates this by advising Mr. Dowell, when she 
learned that it \Yas ~Ir. Sine who wanted to make the 
purchase, that "he should pay more for it." Obviously, 
the only reason he should pay more than anyone else 
"~as that he o"~ned the adjoining property and by ob-
taining a large piece of frontage he would make the 
con1bined piece more valuable than if it were held by 
separate o\vners. ~\nd, of course, the only way to n1ake 
it more Yalurrble to hin1 \Yas to permit him to straighten 
up his lines, as does the sketch in the first 'part of this 
brief. Under these circumstances, if a real estate agent 
had come to ~Irs. Jensen and advised her th·at the owner 
of the auto court wanted to buy the duplex property 
but was not interested in the narrow p,iece of vacant 
property between the duplex and the auto court, and 
that the purchaser was going to tear down the duplex 
and erect a building on the ground, she would have sup-
posed that either the o'vner of the -auto court or the real 
estate agent was out of his mind. It is unthinkable that 
the respondents would have bargained for the duplex 
and left a gap between their holdings, and equally un-
thinkable that Mrs. Jensen would have assumed that 
such was the transaction. And relating_ the 1p,rice to he 
paid for the frontage of 75 feet and commenting that 
it amounted to more than $100 a foot when a piece down 
the street sold for $85 a foot makes inescapable the fact 
that }.{r. Dowell and Mrs. Jensen understood each other 
and were talking about the sam-e thing. 
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Use of the numbers for the ·street address was sim-
ply a convenient way of referring to the property, in-
asmuch as the vacant property had no street number. 
And of course the respondents had no way of know-
' ' ing the width of the vacant piece as compared to the tract 
upon which the duplex was situated and no way of know-
ing that it was not all one piece. Mrs. Jensen apparently 
referred to the p·roperty in her own mind in the same 
way because in her will, made a few months after this 
transaction, and before respondents had learned of the 
mistake or commenced this suit, she referred to her 
property at 656-658 West North Temple, without refer-
ence to any vacant piece (probate :file in supplemental 
record). 
Citing cases on this question probably is not very 
helpful to the court. In cases of this kind each must 
stand upon its own p~eculiar facts and the test is the im-
pression conveyed to the court. A recital of the facts 
is so useless as a precedent that in Gray v. Gray, 108 
Utah 338, 160 P. 2d 432, this Court reviewed the evi-
dence but did not recite it in its opinion and simply said 
that the evidence is clear and convincing and that is a 
suffcient an.s,ver. 
The important thing in this case is that the strip 
of p·roperty in dispute determines whether respondents 
have squared up their property or have simply acquired 
an isolated ·pjece in the general vicinity of their other 
property. In Rauhut v. O'Donnel, 37 Atl. 2d 66, the Dele-
\vare Chancery Court granted reformation to include 
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one-half of the ground under a party wall as they found 
it difficult to believe that p·arties would not agree to sell 
the land upon 'vhich the house stood. And respondents 
submit that it is equally difficult to believe and for the 
deceased to haYe believed that the respondents would 
have bargained for anything less than the property 
"Thich adjoined theirs. 
The deceased and the respondents did not walk 
around the property together but this was not necessary 
~inee the property 'Yrrs so 'vell known to both of them. 
In effect, they were in the san1e position as the partie.:; 
in Nordfors v. Knight, 90 Utah114, 60 P. 2d 1115, where 
the plaintiff and defendant had walked over the land 
together and made some measurements on it and entered 
into a bargain which the court held must have been for 
the property they had examined and had in mind. At 
page 118 of 90 Utah the court comments on the fact 
that the parties looked over the land together, although 
nothing was said about boundary lines. The court states: 
''We deem it unnecessary to make a further 
statement of the evidence, as we think the evi-
dence is clear, definite, and convincing that the 
parties intended to include this 18.4 acres of 
pasture land in the sale. The mere fact that 
defendant denies some of the material matters 
testified to by plaintiff does not prevent the evi-
dence from being clear, definite, and convincing. 
Davidson v. Bailey, 53 Okl. 91, 115 P. 511; Kar.r 
v. Pe·arl, 212 Ky. 387, 279 S.W. 631. It rarely 
happens that the testimony is undisputed and un-
controverted.'' 
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In Cram v. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384, 186 P. 100, this 
Court reformed a contract to include shares of water 
~stock in the belief that the evidence showed that the 
parties were thinking of the water when the bargain 
was made and that it was omitted from the contract by 
mistake. The trial court had refused reformation but 
this court revised the judgment, decreed reformation, 
and granted sp·ecific performance of the contract. The 
farm land in that eas,e without water was as unthink-
able a bargain as would caf~ property in our case be 
without acquiring the land which gives access to it from 
the prop,erty already held by the respondents. 
In George v. Frits·ch Loan & Trust Co., 69 Utah 460, 
at page 470, 256 P. 400, thi.s court, in a case in which 
reformation was denied, laid down this rule: 
''From a review of the authorities cited by 
counsel in their res·pective briefs, together with 
other cases and textwriters, we are of opinion 
that the better rule is that where the partiea have 
in advance orally agreed upon the terms of a 
contract and later in reducing the contract to 
writing some of its tern1s are omitted by inad-
vertence or mistake, no absolute rule can be laid 
down, but in determining whether either of the 
parties is entitled to have the contract reforn1ed 
to express the oral agreement of the parties, much 
depends upon the particular facts and circum-
stances of each case.'' 
The surl'ounding circumstances in this case coupled 
,,,.ith the conversations had between the agent of the 
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respondents and the vendor make plain that the agree-
ment betw·een the parties was for sale of the 75-foot 
frontage which "'"ould square up the p·roperty of the 
respondents. The evidence of the daughters of the de-
ceased, all of who1n were intere.sted parties, was ap-
parently ignored by the trial court and should be ignored 
by this eourt as incompetent and immaterial. Even if 
the court considered the testimony and believed it, no 
other decision is indicated. If it be assumed that Mrs. 
Wheeler and her mother had the conversation to which-
nfrs .. Wheeler testified (and the story is just too pat to 
be reasonable), it meant that Mrs. Jensen defrauded 
the respondents and the respondents should have judg-
ment under their reply instead of the com·plaint, which 
error is not prejudicial. The testimony of the other sis-
ters, if ~Irs. Wheeler's is disbelieved, would only serve to 
fix the date on which ~Irs. J e_nsen realized that the agree-
ments had inadvertently omitted the vacant strip and 
the time, therefore, on which she made up her mind that 
she would endeavor to exchange the bargain made for 
the more favorable contract. 
SUilf~t:ARY AND CONCLUSION 
If respondents are right on the first three points 
of this argument most of the testimony of the appellant 
was improperly received and should be ignored by the 
court. This court can also assume that the trial court 
did not believe the testimony of appellant and ignore 
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it for that reason without any effort to reconcile the 
testimony. 
R;espondents contend that their testimony creating 
an agency with Mr. Dowell was properly received and 
that the similar testim·ony of Mr. Dowell was properly 
received as being the verbal act of creating the ·agency; 
and that the testimony of Mr. Dowell with the deceased 
was not incompetent under the dead man's statute inas. 
much as Mr. Dowell was not a person direetly interested 
in the event of the suit. These conversations made plain 
the ground being bargained for and the conversation of 
Mrs. Jensen was equally plain that she understood what 
Mr. Sine was offering to purchase. This evidence being 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing, the judgment of 
the trial court .should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND BIRD 
Attorneys for Resp.ondents 
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